



















2 Gender in the global climate 
governance regime 
A day late and a dollar short? 
Karen Morrow 
Introduction: Getting gender on the agenda 
The constitution, form, practices and culture of institutions generally (interna-
tional institutions among them) are increasingly understood as important not only
in mandating and structuring activities within their particular remits but also in
exercising a gate-keeping role. The latter is exhibited in the voices and inter-
ests that they include/exclude from participation in their processes. Institutions
and their operation ultimately embody and emphasise the broader contours of our
societies and thus exhibit strongly gendered structural characteristics, which have
long been the subject of feminist inquiry and analysis (Prugl and Meyer, 1999).
In this context, Meryl Kenny’s application of a feminist lens to path dependency
(which suggests that early institutional choices shape and limit subsequent regime
developments) and functionalist views of institutional change provides particu-
larly fruitful insights for considering the shaping of international climate govern-
ance (Kenny, 2007). While often presented as alternative explanatory models, it
can be said that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC, 1992) regime exhibits features of both approaches. In terms of path
dependency, as a novel manifestation of a historically gendered international legal
system, the UNFCCC regime’s roots shape its institutions and institutional cul-
ture. Put briefy, it has long been argued by feminist scholars that, while ostensibly
presenting itself as gender-neutral, ‘international law has a gender … that gen-
der is a male one, and … this skews the discipline’ (Charlesworth, 2002, p. 94).
Furthermore, it has been observed that it remains the case that ‘[t]here is, by and
large, a disproportionate representation of men in the institutions of international
law’ (ibid.). The usually uninterrogated privileged, male-dominated and largely
masculinist nature of international legal institutions signally hampers their ability
to evolve and to develop creative approaches to new areas, the approach on offer
being to all intents and purposes ‘more of the same’. 
Continuing gender disparity within UN institutions raises serious questions as 
to the profound and seemingly intractable nature of this aspect of structural ine-
quality, particularly in the face of much-vaunted systemic recognition and serial 
attempts to engage with it (Morrow, 2006). The fact that the UN has, since its 
inception, raised the need to address gender equality, not least as a foundational 
and supposedly integral part of its core human rights agenda in both the 1945 UN 
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Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, seemingly augurs 
well (UN OHCHR, 2014). On one level this positive impression is augmented 
by specifc and ongoing coverage for rights-based approaches to women’s par-
ticipation in and across the UN and states. Rights-based coverage, for example, 
features strongly in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article 8 of which is germane in 
the current context, providing that: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on 
equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to 
represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in 
the work of international organizations. 
(UN CEDAW, 1979) 
Women’s participation rights were further amplifed by the ambitious 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action (UN OHCHR, 2014). The document fea-
tures dedicated coverage for women in power and decision-making, developing 
institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, and addressing wom-
en’s human rights (UN BDPA, 1995, Chapter IV, sections G, H and I, respec-
tively). The rationale for including coverage of this nature was succinctly stated: 
Equality in political decision-making performs a leverage function without 
which it is highly unlikely that a real integration of the equality dimension 
in government policy-making is feasible. 
(UN BDPA, 1995, para. 181) 
The observation remains as cogent today as when it was made. The same holds 
for international policy-making contexts as they are populated by representatives 
selected by states. The strategic objectives for governments under the BDPA 
included what have become familiar themes: data collection and monitoring 
in the pursuit of gender balance, both domestically and in regard to UN bod-
ies (UN BDPA, 1995, para. 190). The UN itself was also charged with putting 
its own house in order by pursuing gender equality in its staffng, particularly 
at senior level, and with collecting and disseminating data on its progress (UN 
BDPA, 1995, para. 193). However, while the UN’s engagement with gender has 
matured, developing in range and sophistication over time (Morrow, 2006), it 
is also the case that there has been a constant need for periodic high-profle re-
engagement with gender issues. The latter throws a less positive light on matters, 
being prompted by a continuing paucity of progress on the ground. It remains the 
case that progress on realising rights is uneven and in consequence: 
Women around the world … regularly suffer violations of their human rights 
throughout their lives, and realising women’s human rights has not always 
been a priority. 
(UN OHCHR, 2014, p. 1) 
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The UNFCCC is frmly located in this long-established milieu and on this ground 
alone would have been ripe for feminist inquiry in the cause of the imperative 
need to address inclusivity and equality. 
At the same time, there is also a strong functionalist dimension to the insti-
tutional character of the UNFCCC system, rooted in the manner in which cli-
mate change was characterised in the fedgling regime, which has also profoundly 
shaped it and its approach to its role. The elements of the regime are many and 
their inter-relationship complex. For present purposes, the main regime actors 
and roles are state signatories who make up the supreme governing body of the 
convention in question; in the UNFCCC this is known as the Conference of 
Parties (CoP). Signatory states also provide the members of the regime’s spe-
cialist, limited membership constituted bodies, which are charged with carrying 
out a range of subject-specifc technical roles. The activities of the CoP and the 
constituted bodies are supported by a number of enabling bodies, notably, the 
regime’s Secretariat, which provides general technical advice and support and 
organisational services and the more focused Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI). Additionally, a number of recognised non-state actors now play a variety 
of roles in regime activities. In initially characterising climate change as a tech-
nical issue, suitable for traditional state-centric international law coverage and 
dominated by the search for scientifc and economic ‘fxes’ (themselves reliant on 
male-dominated disciplines) its pervasive, cross-cutting complex nature was not 
fully addressed (UN FCCC, 1992; Morrow, 2017a, p. 31). The social dimensions 
of climate change were initially largely absent from consideration in the regime, 
though, in fairness to the UNFCCC Secretariat, it recognised this lack at a fairly 
early stage and expanded its stakeholder engagement beyond states to embrace 
(some) major societal groups in its activities. However, the approach adopted 
tended to augment the initial masculinist dominance of technical and economic 
concerns within the regime (Morrow, 2017b, p. 39). The various voids that this 
approach propagated and perpetuated now seem obvious, yet took many years for 
the UNFCCC regime to grasp, in part because: 
Essentially, people tend to assume that our own way of thinking about or 
doing things is typical. … If the majority of people in power are men – and 
they are – the majority of people in power just don’t see it. Male bias just 
looks like ‘common sense’ to them. 
(Perez, 2019, p. 270) 
Tellingly, the newly expansive approach towards stakeholder groups did not, for 
many years and despite vigorous and sustained campaigning, extend to women. 
The regime’s failure to act decisively on gender inclusion was mystifying on a 
number of levels, not least as the UNFCCC had long been on the record as 
recognising the fact that women were underrepresented in its activities and on 
its constituted bodies and that this needed to be addressed (UN FCCC, 2001). 
This apperception did not, however, prompt an effective response, with calls for 
data collection and dissemination with reference to the gender composition of 
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the regime’s constituted bodies failing to generate much impact. Alongside this, 
it took the best part of two decades for the constituency status enjoyed by other 
major groups under the regime to fnally be accorded to the Women and Gender 
Constituency (WGC) in 2011 (Morrow, 2017a, pp. 33, 37–38). This develop-
ment coincided with a higher profle for gender in the context of discussions 
about climate change among UN institutions more generally, notably in bodies 
with remits in gender and in environmental matters (Morrow, 2017a, pp. 34–35). 
It was more particularly prompted by activity in the cognate ‘Rio Conventions’, 
comprising the UNFCCC itself, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and 
the subsequently adopted United Nations Framework Convention to Combat 
Desertifcation (UNCCD) in which gender featured prominently, in their prepa-
rations for the Rio+20 Conference in 2012. The activities of the CBD and the 
UNCCD had seen gender not only raised but also engaged with (albeit to varying 
degrees) at a regime level in a way that, until this point, those of the UNFCCC 
had not and the latter was, in comparison a laggard (CBD, UNCCD, UNFCCC, 
2012, p. 5; Morrow, 2017a, p. 35). 
Gender landmarks in the UNFCCC regime 
Monitoring and reporting on gender representation 
Decision 23/CP.18, adopted at the UNFCCC CoP in Doha in 2012, arguably 
signals the start of an attempt to promote serious engagement with gender in 
global climate change governance (UN FCCC, 2012). The Decision’s title set 
out its stall very clearly: ‘Promoting gender balance and improving the participa-
tion of Women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in 
bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol’. Decision 
23/CP.18 was hugely important in both principle and evolving regime prac-
tice. It not only served to reiterate concerns previously (though sporadically) 
raised about the gender composition of the UNFCCC’s constituted bodies; it 
also looked explicitly to the gender make-up of signatory state delegations. More 
importantly still, it set the scene for gender to become a regular (rather than 
merely occasional) regime agenda item. The crucial element of Decision 23/ 
CP.18 lay in beginning to construct a factual foundation upon which to ground 
regime actions on gender, by regularising and enhancing monitoring, and report-
ing on gender representation in state delegations and constituted bodies. In con-
sequence, annual reports on the composition have featured in the UNFCCC’s 
regular diet of business since 2013 and this remains a central component of how 
the regime presents its coverage of gender issues. While a more granular analysis 
is not possible within the confnes of the current chapter, even a basic explora-
tion of material drawn from the regime’s annual gender composition reports from 
2013 to date is revealing (UN FCCC Gender and Climate Change Documents, 
n.d.). Figure 2.1 takes the average representation of women in the UNFCCC’s 
constituted bodies1 as an example and shows that taken overall, despite the 
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Figure 2.1 Average percentage female and male membership of UNFCCC constituted 
bodies drawn from gender composition reports 
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Figure 2.2 UNFCCC highest and lowest percentages of female representation on 
constituted bodies 2013–2019 
promotion of gender equality, progress has been scant. This remains the case 
when the expansion over this period of the number of constituted bodies from 
11 to 15 is accounted for. 
Figure 2.2, showing the top and bottom of the range of percentages of women 
sitting on constituted bodies, is also disappointing. While, as Figure 2.2 shows, 
particularly from 2017 onwards, upper averages are improving, the lower regis-
ter remains stubbornly on or below 10%. Figure 2.3 likewise shows a bifurcated 
picture: while in 2019 female representation was 30% and above on nine of the 
regime’s 15 constituted bodies, closer inspection of the source material reveals 
that there is still a long way to go. Of these nine bodies, women’s representa-
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Figure 2.3 Percentage of women members of UNFCCC constituted bodies 2019 
Only the Adaptation Committee (which has consistently been among the better 
performers on women’s representation, and more so since 2016) and the Paris 
Committee on Capacity Building exceed this, though both include well over 
50% female members. Furthermore, in 2019, fve constituted bodies still have a 
less than 30% female complement. At the bottom of the lower range of repre-
sentation, the powerful Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, 
which, while now an outlier rather than, as previously, typical of many of its peer 
bodies, persists at a damning 10% (where it has stood since 2015, falling from 
20% in 2014). 
Acting to change institutional culture 
The provision of statistical data remains the most prominent strand in the 
UNFCCC regime’s own account of its engagement with gender. However, while 
such material is necessary to provide the basis for debate seeking to alter insti-
tutional culture and serves to capture what Lena Wängnerud (2009) has termed 
descriptive representation, it cannot suffce to promote effective engagement 
with gender issues. This requires a deeper, conscious and active engagement with 
equality, which, as revealed by work on domestic parliaments and gender, inevita-
bly collides directly with gendered systems, structures and practices (Wängnerud, 
2009, p. 52; Criado Perez, 2019, pp. 271–286). The fgures above strongly suggest 
that the same is true for the regime machinery of international agreements such 
as the UNFCCC, where data production and dissemination have not prompted 
appreciable progress. While the UNFCCC constituted bodies have a shorter his-
tory than domestic institutions, they are, as discussed above, grafted on to a sys-
tem hallmarked by entrenched gender inequality. In any event, even presence in 
numbers, while necessary to progress gender equality in a system, is not necessar-
ily suffcient (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 59). 
Thus, in addition to considering women’s presence in regime bodies, it is also 
crucial to examine what Wängnerud (2009) terms substantive representation, 
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that is, the effects of women’s presence on the regime. In the context of the 
UNFCCC, these will be examined by considering indicative developments in 
the regime’s gender culture through the changing nature of the coverage it offers 
to gender issues. 
The UNFCCC has not confned its activities to recording the numbers of 
women present in its constituent bodies and national delegations. The search 
for increased effcacy saw the gender agenda coalesce in the activities of the 
Conference of Parties itself, with the adoption of a suite of important decisions 
shaping the regime’s new approach. These documents are signifcant in that, 
while they continue to be led by quantitative elements, focusing on participation 
metrics, this is now coupled with commitments to substantive action with more 
qualitative dimensions. The latter demonstrates a shift, seeking to improve not 
just the numbers of women active in regime processes but also their ability to par-
ticipate meaningfully in them. Decision 18/CP20 on the Lima Work Programme 
on Gender (LWPG) was a landmark in this process (UN FCCC, 2014). The 
document, weighing in at only two pages, was brief but foundational, focusing on 
improving the coherence of the regime’s work to address gender through main-
streaming in the UNFCCC regime. Signifcantly, the contextual markers identi-
fed by the LWPG included CEDAW and the UN BDPA. The work programme 
was set up to pursue gender balance and develop gender-responsive climate policy 
(the meaning of which it promises to clarify) to improve women’s participation 
in the regime’s constituted bodies. The programme included strengthened report-
ing requirements, but also looked to substantive matters centred on training and 
capacity building and, perhaps most importantly of all, committed to a review 
in 2016, keeping progress under scrutiny (UN FCCC, 2014, paras. 3–6 and 16, 
respectively). 
Incremental progress continued with the adoption of Decision 3/CP.23 
(UNFCCC, 2017), which added a gender action plan (GAP) to the LWPG. The 
CoP had requested that the SBI develop the GAP in Decision 21/CP.22, with a 
view to supporting the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates 
within the UNFCCC. A fairly broad range of potential courses of action was 
outlined therein, including ‘identifying priority areas, key activities and indica-
tors, timelines for implementation … responsible and key actors and indicative 
resource requirements for each activity’ and enhanced monitoring and review 
processes (UN FCCC, 2016, para. 27). If the LWPG provided the skeleton of 
the regime’s new, ostensibly more coherent approach to gender, the GAP put 
fesh on these bones. The GAP ran until 2019 and identifed fve priority areas, 
deliverables for each and the actors responsible for them. The fve priority areas 
comprised knowledge-sharing, gender balance, coherence, implementation and 
monitoring and reporting. While some of these areas share a strong quantitative 
bent with earlier initiatives, the package taken as a whole now demonstrates a 
mixed approach, though with qualitative elements continuing to play a part across 
the board. The hybrid approach espoused is apparent, for example, in priority area 
B, on gender balance – which on the face of it would seem to be largely quan-











elements, such as the promotion of travel funds for female participants in regime 
process, and information about gender balance to accompany recruitment to con-
stituted bodies, it also featured two activities centred on training, which also 
looked to qualitative considerations concerning capacity-building. The responsi-
ble actors identifed included state parties, the UNFCCC Secretariat, other UN 
bodies and relevant external organisations (UNFCCC, 2017, Annex). The GAP 
is presented as a four-page annex to Decision 3/CP.23, the frst of which outlined 
the fve priority areas and the remaining three of which comprised closely writ-
ten tables for each of them, detailing activities, the attribution of responsibilities, 
timelines, deliverables/outputs and the level at which implementation is required 
(local, national, regional and/or international). The task and action approach 
adopted in the GAP has a number of advantages in terms of expectation man-
agement and transparency for all actors within the UNFCCC system. While a 
rational and coherent approach does not of itself guarantee progress, it does at 
least serve to offer desirable consistency. 
Pursuant to the LWPG and the GAP’s stated priority to ensure that gender was 
integrated into the work of 11 of the UNFCCC’s constituted bodies,2 in 2019 the 
UNFCCC Secretariat produced a desk-based synthesis report on progress (or the 
lack of it) to date on reporting of gender coverage within the various mandates 
involved (UN FCCC, 2019a). The report identifed basic progress through time, 
in that while in 2017 only six constituted bodies mentioned gender as part of 
their regular reporting processes, in 2018 this had increased to 11. However, most 
were acknowledged as offering at best cursory coverage, indicating only marginal 
improvement. Of the seven that reported in some depth on their progress in inte-
grating gender into their processes and work, only three reported that they had 
instituted practical action such as setting up working groups and/or gender focal 
points or instituting their own gender action plans (UN FCCCC, 2019a, para. 
8–10). Slight improvement on previous practice must, however, be set against 
the fact that, the UNFCCC’s multiple efforts in the last few years notwithstand-
ing, coverage was at best uneven. It ranged from comprehensive approaches by 
some through to two constituted bodies that provided such limited information 
that it was not possible to determine their progress. Furthermore, where gender 
was reported upon, the approach adopted was idiosyncratic, making comparison 
and the sharing of best practice challenging. The provision of UNFCCC guid-
ance on the form and substance required for gender progress reports was suggested 
to improve the utility of the reporting process (UN FCCC, 2019a, para. 121). 
The LWPG and GAP themselves fell to be reviewed by the SBI (UN FCCC,
2019b). The SBI’s evaluation of progress on the fve priorities, based on submis-
sions from a range of state parties and observer organisations, also pointed to the
importance of the LWPG to the regime’s institutional culture as a framework for
gender action and the GAP as the practical focus for action. In the latter context,
the LMPG and GAP were identifed as providing a platform for stakeholders to
exchange information on and to advance the fve priorities. Review participants
also took the opportunity to suggest improvements, showing that the LWPG and







Gender in global climate governance 25 
process. This is confrmed by the adoption of Decision 3/CP.25 of the Enhanced
Lima Work Programme on Gender (ELWPG) and its gender action plan (UN
FCCC, 2019c), which are to run until 2024. The ELWPG rehearses the usual back-
ground mantra of the climate change regime: reiterating links with other UN remits
(notably the SDGs), exhorting states to act and requesting that the Secretariat con-
tinue to provide support to enable them to do so. However, as anyone familiar with
the UNFCCC’s attempts to improve its practice on gender equality fully expects, it
also clearly acknowledges that, previous efforts notwithstanding, there is a 
persistent lack of progress in and the urgent need for improving the represen-
tation of women in Party delegations and constituted bodies. 
(UN FCCC, 2019c, para. 2) 
The augmented GAP is similar in length, content and organisation to its pre-
decessor – and in many ways also indicates a ‘more of the same’ approach. Once 
again taking priority area B, gender balance, participation and women’s leader-
ship, as an example, travel funding and training remain as identifed activities. 
An additional strand of activity concerns working with the Local Communities 
and Indigenous Peoples Platform Facilitative Working Group (LCIPPFWG) ‘on 
women’s leadership and enhancing the participation of local communities and 
indigenous women in climate policy and action … to the extent that it is consist-
ent with the workplan of the … [LCIPPFWG] … and within existing resources’ 
(UN FCCC, 2019c, B3). Given that women’s participation is often contentious 
in these contexts (UN Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
[SPFII] et al., 2010), it is diffcult to gauge how effective this activity will be, 
beyond initiating a dialogue on the issues. However, in a crucial exception to 
the prevalent ‘more of the same’ approach, the most signifcant development in 
the new GAP involves priority area D, gender-responsive implementation and 
means of implementation. This sees a shift in emphasis in the action plan, with 
seven activity areas identifed, a signifcant increase on the three covered in the 
2017 version. Priorities continue developing work with various women’s organi-
sations to better inform approaches to gender issues but extend to: improving 
the provision of gender-disaggregated data, sharing good practice on mainstream-
ing gender in climate policy, and support for integrating gender into the central 
funding and technical concerns of the regime. The fact that the implementation 
strand is now providing for the main thrust of activity in the GAP is signifcant in 
drawing attention to gender implications in some of the core practical elements 
of the UNFCCC. 
In addition to the work programmes and action plans, the UNFCCC charged 
its Secretariat with securing practical improvements in the regime’s operation 
and outputs by developing a series of technical papers to inform the regime’s 
approach to gender. Such synchronous developments were geared to promote 
deeper integration of gender into the regime’s architecture. One important exam-
ple lay in identifying possible actions in the workstreams of the regime’s consti-




progress towards the parties’ goals on gender balance and gender-responsive cli-
mate policy (UN FCCC TP, 2018). The technical papers, in turn, form the basis 
for further work – in this example, the CoP in Decision 3/CP.23 (UNFCCC, 
2017) requested that its outcomes and recommendations form the basis of a 
dialogue between the chairs of the constituted bodies, to share experience and 
expertise and build capacity for effective engagement with gender. 
Increasing the profle and visibility of gender in the UNFCCC 
regime 
If progress on gender representation and integration leaves much to be desired, 
it is nevertheless the case that gender has become an established (if unevenly 
realised) agenda item across UNFCCC processes. Gender coverage is now also 
a much more visible and accessible presence on the organisation’s website. In 
addition to prominent positioning as one of the regime’s headline topics, col-
lated coverage of relevant regime decisions and documents pertaining to gender 
is now provided (UN FCCC Gender and Climate Change Documents, n.d.). The 
gender topic is also furnished with cross-cutting links to other core areas of the 
UNFCCC regime, namely adaptation, mitigation, capacity-building, technology, 
climate fnance and cross-cutting topics (UN FCCC Topics, n.d.). 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the coverage of gender in regime documents has 
broadly (if initially sporadically) increased over time, admittedly from paltry 
beginnings in 2001. More consistent development, prompted by shifts in the 
priority that the UNFCCC has accorded to gender in its institutional activities 
(discussed above), began in 2012 and relevant regime activity since has been 
considerably more frequent and, while not constant, operates at a level that dem-
onstrates at least a core level of engagement each year. 
Other forms of more public-facing engagement by the UNFCCC regime also 
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Figure 2.4 Numbers of UNFCCC documents pertaining per gender 
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development was the addition of a regular ‘Gender Day’ event to the meetings 
of the conference of parties from 2012 onwards (UN Women, 2012). A second 
innovation saw the regular inclusion of practically oriented gender-based work-
shops at regime meetings (UN FCCC, 2013). While these developments could 
have been fairly superfcial, they have not only generated headlines but have also 
raised the profle of gender issues in the main business processes of the UNFCCC, 
at the same time as providing opportunities to interrogate the regime’s short-
comings and attempt to build capacity to address them. Gender days have, for 
example, highlighted progress on gender equality and climate change (2014), 
the economic case for gender-responsive climate action (2017) and gender and 
national adaptation plans (2019). Gender workshops (reports on which are 
subsequently fed into the regime by its Secretariat) have addressed core topics 
such as gender and mitigation (2015), gender and adaptation (2016) and the 
gender-differentiated impacts of climate change and gender-responsive climate 
policy and action (2018). It is an indication of continuing institutional commit-
ment that workshops on integrating gender into national climate actions have 
not been side-lined by the COVID-19 pandemic but instead moved online in a 
development which should help to retain their momentum (UN FCCC, 2020). 
The Paris Agreement and gender 
Much is made by the UNFCCC on its website of the fact that gender attained 
preambular status in the Paris Agreement (PA), which acknowledges that, as 
climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when 
taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their 
respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of 
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with dis-
abilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, 
as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity. 
(UN FCCC, 2015b, emphasis added) 
However, while the PA could have been a springboard for a more balanced, 
socially directed approach to climate change coming to the fore, in many ways 
it missed the mark, not least with regard to gender, which garnered a scant three 
mentions in the Agreement’s main text. While the preamble to the PA adopts a 
more socially contextualised approach to climate change than hitherto, its role in 
the regime is comparatively limited, largely serving to provide an interpretative 
context for the substantive articles included in the main body of the Agreement. 
Gender had been a live issue during the negotiating process and prominent in 
the draft agreement – it was mentioned nine times in the bracketed negotiating 
text (UN FCCC, 2015a). Many were, however, hugely disappointed by what 
the PA actually delivered on gender, as the inter-state negotiating process took 
effect. One result was that elements perceived by some states as controversial, 
including, as Rochette observes, most of those on gender, were excised from the 
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text (Rochette, 2017, p. 254). In the Agreement as adopted, gender was siloed 
in coverage of adaptation (UN FCCC, 2015b, Article 7) and mitigation (UN 
FCCC, 2015b, Article 11). 
The use of language in the preamble to the PA, calling on states to ‘respect, 
promote and consider’ their human rights obligations, is remarkable and arguably 
signals a great deal in attitudinal terms. The usual parlance with regard to states’ 
human rights obligations requires them to ‘respect, protect and fulfl’ (emphasis 
added) them. In short, under the guise of ‘respect’, states are expected to refrain 
from interfering with human rights. To ‘protect’ requires that states address 
human rights issues for individuals and groups – ‘promotion’ is a much looser, 
hortatory term and not a like-for-like substitute. The obligation to ‘fulfl’ requires 
states to take positive action to deliver on the human rights that they have com-
mitted to (UN OHCHR, n.d.). An obligation merely to ‘consider’ (i.e. to take 
into account) is not commensurate with an obligation to fulfl (i.e. deliver) on 
human rights. The orientation of this preambular clause of the PA is signifcant 
in real terms, as it is now seen as representing part of the institutionally accepted 
context for actions under the UNFCCC (UN FCCC, 2019c). This careful and 
deliberate use of language is crucially important – in effect, it seeks to pay lip-
service to human rights, while at the same time diluting state obligations to act 
to secure those rights that are increasingly recognised by the UN’s human rights 
machinery to be infringed/infringeable by climate change (UN OHCHR, 2019). 
This is particularly signifcant with regard to gender, as women are recognised as 
a particularly vulnerable group in the context of climate change and as having 
protected human rights in this regard (UN OHCHR, 2019, paras. 45–47 and 64, 
respectively). Such gendered effects of climate change have long been recognised 
by many UN entities (Morrow, 2017a, p. 34), not least CEDAW (most recently 
in CEDAW, 2018). 
The Sustainable Development Goals, Agenda 2030 and gender 
The inclusion of reference to human rights in the PA itself is ambiguous, recog-
nising their relevance to climate change in principle while distancing the regime 
from their implementation in practice. Nevertheless, it is evident that, despite 
the evasive approach adopted, the very act of inclusion has affected the context 
of the climate change debate, serving to further fuel the active engagement of 
the UN human rights and gender machinery on climate change where it crosses 
into their respective remits. A similar situation arose in the cross-cutting of the 
gender/human rights/environment nexus (including climate change) expressed 
in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) (UN GA, 
2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNDP, 2015). This is 
signifcant as there is clearly acknowledged crossover between the UNFCCC and 
the SDGs and Agenda 2030, not least in respect of Goal 13, climate action, and 
its supporting targets (UN GA, 2015, para. 14). While gender is covered in the 
SDGs themselves, both discretely (under Goal 5) and as a cross-cutting concern 
in a number of other goals and appears in many of the regime’s supporting targets 
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(Morrow, 2018), it is more prominent still in Agenda 2030. Nevertheless, in both 
contexts, rights-based coverage is again effectively side-stepped (Morrow, 2018). 
However, fawed as the coverage offered may be, the fact that gender is included 
in the SDGs provides an additional route to invoke gender equality, which is 
signifcant in the context of the increasingly regularised interplay between the 
climate change and SDG regimes. The latter is indicated, for example, by the 
inclusion of ‘Action on Climate and the SDGs’ under UNFCCC topics (UN 
FCCC Topics, n.d.). 
A plethora of institutional activity – But to what avail? 
The UNFCCC regime machinery has, belatedly, engaged prolifcally with the 
gender agenda and its approach has matured considerably, yet its impact has 
been at best limited. This begs the question, what is needed to do better? On 
paper, the building of a sound foundation of accurate and transparent data, its 
dissemination within the UNFCCC, and tying it in, however symbolically, with 
the human rights and SDG agendas more broadly, demonstrates some promise 
for more thoroughgoing engagement with gender and climate change than hith-
erto. Were this all that had been done, it would, however, have been open to 
interpretation as a cynical exercise in ecomodernism, favouring form over sub-
stance. However, latterly it has been joined by the promotion of institutional 
refection, debate and change, which ostensibly provides a more grounded basis 
for addressing substantive gender inequality issues. In practice, though, progress, 
even within the UNFCCC’s own constituent bodies, has been frankly unimpres-
sive. Self-evidently, more needs to be done – but what? Bringing gender into 
sharper focus than ever before has made the pervasive nature of gender inequal-
ity even more apparent. This is important in itself, as it lays bare the root of the 
failure of UNFCCC initiatives to gain much traction – state inaction on gender 
equality. The failure of states to live up to their international legal commitments 
is notionally a source of political embarrassment vis-à-vis other states and stake-
holders and often described as a potent lever to motivate states to action in both 
international human rights law (Cassel, 2001) and international environmental 
law (Benedick, 1998). Yet slow progress and even regression in gender equal-
ity suggest that both in general (as outlined above) and in the context of the 
UNFCCC shame does not always serve as an effective driver of state behaviour. 
The UNFCCC has done much to set its own house in order, but, as is read-
ily apparent from the discussion above, if it is confned to hortatory approaches 
to its state signatories, these will not suffce to bring about deeper change, as 
states are effectively free to ignore exhortations to act on existing gender equal-
ity commitments. In theory, the UNFCCC could do more; in recognition of the 
pervasive and deeply entrenched nature of gender inequality, a suite of tools has 
been identifed that can help to forge progress, for example, temporary quotas to 
promote participation (CEDAW, 2004; UN OHCHR, 2014). Failure to address 
gender equality could also be subject to innovative corrective action within the 












by limiting participation rights to a guaranteed minimum but rewarding gender-
equal delegations with support and increased opportunities to participate above 
that minimum. In practice, though, as an intergovernmental organisation, the 
UNFCCC is in a weak position to compel states to act, as it, in effect, relies 
on their goodwill to operate. The fundamental sovereign status of states in this 
area, as in all others, remains the ultimate brake on progress. Political buy-in 
and sustained commitment to the pursuit of gender equality by the UNFCCC’s 
signatory states is crucial, but remains controversial for some states, standing in 
the way of consensus. Additionally, but relatedly, state fnancial buy-in is also 
necessary to further progress – if gender equality is not viewed as a priority, it is 
not adequately resourced and progress will be hampered. It is telling that most 
UNFCCC documents on gender equality repeat the refrain that action is subject 
to the availability of fnancial resources. 
What is needed? Updating, expanding and fully realising 
UNFCCC engagement with gender issues 
The UNFCCC began as a male-dominated, masculinist-oriented regime and
despite concerted efforts to correct this, the continued paucity of women’s par-
ticipation and its limited impact underline that this remains largely the case in
substance, if not in form. Insofar as equality between women and men within the
global climate governance regime is concerned, we are dealing with a broadly
improving picture, after a belated start, but the business in hand is very much
unfnished and progress remains quite sporadic and slow overall. This is not the
only area of gender concern where concerted action is needed. Our understanding
of the complexity of sex and gender, extending far beyond the female/male binary,
has been rediscovered (Independent Lens, 2015) and grown apace in recent years.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defnes gender as referring to: 
the roles, behaviours, activities, attributes and opportunities that any society 
considers appropriate for girls and boys, and women and men. Gender inter-
acts with, but is different from, the binary categories of biological sex. 
(WHO, n.d.) 
Thus, an informed and current approach to gender must extend its reach beyond 
the conventional female/male binary and be genderqueered to embrace those of 
all sexes, genders and orientations and indeed those of none. The understanding 
of gender as expressed in our international institutions more generally (human 
rights bodies excepted, discussed briefy below) has now fallen far behind our 
social and scientifc grasp of the issues that it raises and remains dominated by 
the female/male binary. 
As Kenny has observed, feminist analysis has evolved beyond a simplistic 
sexed approach focused on ‘women’s issues’ to embrace a broader perspective on 
gender as performance. Fully pursuing even this has, however, proven problem-
atic when looking at issues of representation, ‘where research continues to focus 
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on female bodies as the “main vehicles” for institutional change and transforma-
tion’ (Kenny, p. 94). It is also the case in global climate change governance that 
gender continues to be largely confated with ‘women’s issues’ and that broader 
gender concerns, notably those relating to LGBTQI+ persons, remain under-
interrogated to the point of near invisibility. UN work in cognate areas, such as 
food security (UNEP, 2018, p. 33) suggests, in passing, that LGBTQI+ people 
face many of the same disadvantages as women, and as these issues intersect with 
climate change, it is therefore reasonable to assume that a broader notion of 
equality than that typically current should be applied to the treatment of gender-
based vulnerability to climate change. This lacuna is fairly typical, as while the 
UN human rights machinery fnally turned its attention to LGBTQI+ rights in 
the last few years, as was the case with women’s issues for many years, other UN 
institutions remain relatively unengaged. It is also the case that the human rights 
activity in this area thus far remains fairly narrow, focusing primarily on frst-
generation (civil and political) rights (UN OHCHR, 2019). Second-generation 
(social and economic) and third-generation (solidarity) rights also need to be 
invoked, not least in the context of climate change, if we are to give full meaning 
to the universality of human rights and dignity in this regard; equal human rights 
are the entitlement of all, gender/no gender notwithstanding. Ebbs and fows in 
the respect accorded to human rights are, given the tide of human affairs, entirely 
to be expected. The core international protections owe their origins to reactions 
to the horrors of World War Two – and it speaks volumes that it was deemed 
necessary to articulate and garner state support for them in the context of vast 
infringements of the most basic entitlements of human beings. While arguments 
on the effcacy of international human rights law are commonplace (Cassel, 
2001), what it does provide is an articulation of core protections that serves as 
a yardstick to evaluate state (and international institutional) behaviour. As the 
boundaries that human rights protection delineate are tested, not least by climate 
change, the willingness – or not – of the international community to deploy 
rights rhetoric as prevention and/or cure is immensely revealing. Human rights 
commitments, then, have an important role to play in the conduct of human 
affairs, albeit as part of a broad, complex and multi-layered framework of legal, 
political and social processes (Cassel, 2001). Where gender and human rights 
are concerned, a global backlash fuelled by some religious and ultra-conservative 
groupings is currently observable in relation to both women’s (UN OHCHR, 
2014; Lilja and Johansson, 2018) and LGBTQI+ rights (UN OHCHR, 2019). 
This backlash demonstrates the precarity of even the limited progress that we 
have made in this regard and that there is a real danger of regression that will 
have broad ramifcations across our societies and act to the detriment of all. 
Conclusion – Process is all very well, but progress must be 
prioritised 
While there has been some progress in addressing gender in the global cli-




continues to dominate. Insofar as gender, narrowly defned across the female/ 
male binary, is concerned, advancement has been uneven and achingly slow. As 
Caroline Criado Perez puts it: 
we have to close the female representation gap. When women are involved 
in decision-making, in research, in knowledge production, women do not 
get forgotten. Female lives and perspectives are brought out of the shadows. 
(Perez, 2019, p. 318) 
It is now also readily apparent that a largely binary focus is too narrow to fully 
address gender issues (UNEP, 2018, p. 196). Furthermore, broader gender iden-
tity and sexuality–related diverse perspectives share many of the hallmarks of 
exclusion that have long been identifed with regard to the basic gender binary. 
Gender equality is not a novel claim, nor should it be regarded as a radical one, 
though given the paucity of progress that we have made in its realisation, one 
could be excused for thinking that it was both. It stands to our shame that the 
constant refrain that commentators must adopt in this feld is slow progress; 
more needs to be done. It remains the case that, in an international legal sys-
tem founded on state sovereignty (Dixon, 2013) and hallmarked by the limited 
enforcement capacity of a regime based on consent and consensus (Dixon, 2013), 
bodies such as the UNFCCC, however committed they are to advancing gen-
der equality, are politically constrained in getting states to live up to their com-
mitments. While more compelling approaches are notionally available, political 
realism in the context of the UNFCCC suggests that persuading states to act will 
continue to be the standard approach. Limited progress to date, however, suggests 
that this is incapable of delivering the paradigm shift required. It remains the case 
that representation – both in presence (which is necessary but not suffcient) 
and, in turn, in infuence – is the sine qua non of progress on gender equality. Self-
interest supports this; if climate change has taught us nothing else, it is that it will 
require the whole range of human ingenuity and agency to tackle it. It requires 
an inclusive approach that brings all human perspectives, female, LGBTQI+ and 
male, to the table – to proceed otherwise is a further act of self-sabotage, adding 
an avoidable additional challenge to the already obdurate problems that we face. 
Notes 
1 Initially there were 11 constituted bodies in total: the Executive Board of the clean 
development mechanism (CDM Executive Board); the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (JISC); the Compliance Committee facilitative branch; the 
Compliance Committee enforcement branch; the Least Developed Countries Expert 
Group (LEG); the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from 
Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (CEG); the Adaptation Fund Board 
(AFB); the Technology Executive Committee (TEC); the Adaptation Committee 
(AC); the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF); and the Advisory Board of the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN Advisory Board). The Executive 
Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated 
with Climate Change Impacts (Executive Committee of the WIM) was added from 
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2014 and included in analysis of the report statistics from 2015. The Paris Committee 
on Capacity Building (PCCB) was added from 2017. The Facilitative Working Group 
of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (fgures analysed relate to 
government members only) and the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts 
of the Implementation of Response Measures were added in 2019. 
2 Namely the AC, AFB, CDM Executive Board, CGE, CTCN Advisory Board, JISC, 
LEG, PCCB, SCF, TEC and Executive Committee of the WIM. Exceptions were task- 
or time-based. 
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